Introduction

Investors naturally fleeing cash and bonds in response to inadequate yields, poor prospective returns, and government monetary and fiscal policies. The narrative of "There Is No Alternative" (TINA) is rampant as investors look to equities as the go-to asset class for a significant proportion of their capital. Unfortunately, this appears imprudent and could even potentially prove entirely mistaken.

In this article, we will explore the critical mistake investors are making in thinking "There is No Alternative" when considering their asset allocation and reveal a real emerging alternative to low cash and bond rates. We will explore how this alternative is essential to a good investment and incredibly prospective in terms of meeting prudent absolute return investor objectives and provides a less risky option to being all-in on risk assets.

Why Cash and Bonds are on the Nose?

Many investors and institutions allocate their assets among some combination of the following asset classes: cash, bonds, property, and equities, in line with their perceived risk profile and investment mandates. Cash and bonds are the traditional defensive assets while property and equities are the traditional risk-on or growth assets. The traditional 60:40 portfolio, or a variation thereof, is used as a kind of passive and lazy basis for portfolios for institutional investment management for the last 40 years. It includes 60% equities and property and 40% cash and bonds. It has been effective historically at producing modest risk-adjusted returns as it has benefited across the board from disinflation and lower interest rates, which has been a structural trend since the early 1980s.

However, now that cash rates have gone all the way to 0 (0.1% in Australia) and bonds have a circa 1% yield, history will not be able to repeat itself in coming years. Furthermore, it is realistic that we may even see the reverse happening as inflation and interest rates begin to rise.

Hence, in contrast to seeing the lovely tailwind for all traditional asset portfolios, we may very realistically see a significant and adverse macroeconomic headwind in the coming years. Furthermore, these asset classes are not priced for this to occur as they - and consensus - are dominated by passive investors who are largely trend following in nature, and who buy irrespective of value. It shows by the exponential growth of passive ETFs that predominantly track a market benchmark. If the massive structural trend changes, traditional assets, and portfolios can be expected to lose from the change in a big way.

Most notably, higher inflation is terrible for most non-inflation indexed bonds (and long-duration assets). Higher discount rates would also challenge highly elevated property and equity valuations that are dependent on low discount rates. Some of these growth assets are arguably deeply divorced from fundamentals because of the TINA mantra and a broad consensus belief that central banks can be relied upon to keep interest rates low forever. Interestingly, there are credible forecasts such as Hussman (see chart below), that equities may not provide the high returns investors are generally expecting. Cash and bonds - even with low-interest rates - are priced to provide inadequate returns to meet even modest return expectations. Investors are hence needing alternative investments with greater return prospects and different rather than common, drivers of return and risk.

Predicted and Actual Returns on Conventional 60/30/10 Portfolios

Source: Hussman Funds

Bonds have often been included in a portfolio for their diversification benefits, on the view that they will perform well when equities underperform and hence lower the huge risk from being only inequities. However, this relies heavily upon bonds having a negative correlation with equities. Unfortunately, history tells us even this cannot be relied upon - and given starting yields and key portfolio risks such as inflation and higher yields today - we should not rely upon bonds being diversifying, as they may not be.

There are many times in history when bonds simply do not diversify equity risk, most particularly when inflation rises, and long-term interest rate expectations rise too fast or above critical levels. Given current government policy around the world is to print and spend with abandon until we get inflation or some other calamity, inflation as a risk should clearly not be ruled out. Disinflation should simply no longer be relied upon as the basis to build an entire portfolio, which as an aside basically completely invalidates most passive portfolio approaches. Paradoxically, these portfolios or index-focused investment styles are more popular than ever.

Furthermore, we know from watching central banks for a very long time that their prognostications about future interest rates and inflation have routinely been incorrect. In contrast, they can be somewhat relied upon to follow the market when market conditions push them to do so. They are also influenced by banks and other market participants pushing them around publicly and otherwise when it suits them - indeed we know of at least one activist fund manager that does this to the RBA (and presumably he does so because he thinks it is effective). One of the greatest fallacies we commonly hear is that central banks control our economies and determine growth and inflation and other economic settings. Simply, we don't believe there is any compelling evidence to suggest they control these. Hence, don't assume they do.

Source: FRB, Bloomberg Finance LP, DB Global Research. Note: Data for the graph courtesy of Torsten Slok, Deutsche Bank

Whether you stick with the traditional portfolio or move more into equities, if you are constrained to traditional long-only assets, you will probably end up with a much riskier and lower returning portfolio today than you had before. Bonds may no longer protect and diversify, and equity risk is escalating with the nature of the investors in equities and higher valuations bringing down future return forecasts. There is certainly plenty to be concerned about contrary to consensus (and I haven't even mentioned Taiwan).

Expect a Paradigm Shift

We can see rampant signs of speculation on equities, and the period we're living through is very reminiscent of late 1999. For instance, there is massive call volume bidding up the prices of the worst quality and most shorted stocks in the market (see diagram below), as well as less shorting in markets than we've seen for a very long time. We could potentially see continuing rises on equities driven by price-insensitive buyers such as index investors and speculators, before a massive market collapse similar to 1987 or early 2000 when the trend reverses. This is what happens in bubbles - they become removed from fundamentals, escalate, last longer than anyone expects, and then - often with unpredictable timing - they collapse.

Bidding up the Prices of the Worst Quality and Most Shorted Stocks in the Market

Source: OCC, Compustat, Haver, Deutsche Bank Asst Allocation

Note: Most shorted defined as top 10% on short interest % of market cap. Sector absolute, equal weighted, monthly rebalance.

We have not had high and increasing inflation for decades. It should be clear that while "this time may not be different", it is very different from the time period which most investors, advisers and institutions have worked through. Importantly, some advisers and institutions are inflexible and hopelessly ill-equipped to manage well anything other than a rising market.

The real question is not what short-term return will be achieved while the bubble inflates, but whether your assets are being risk-managed and what your compounded return is over time when markets turn south. Given many investors are doing exactly what they did in early 2020 when we last witnessed great market complacency, it may be instructive to see what happened to your portfolios in early 2020; how badly was your approach hurt from a market crisis, and how quickly did your approach recover from these falls (if at all?).

Prima facie, while it may be very exciting, far from increasing equities and risk assets into escalating prices and speculative mania, it could very reasonably be argued that it is more reasonable for a prudent investor to be reducing risk when risk-loving is rampant or at least not increasing their exposure. This is even more important for conservative investors or for those who can't tolerate huge losses. It is very difficult to tell when the music will stop, so playing musical chairs with dangerous markets will not suit more conservative investors who are averse to large drawdowns.

We do not argue against owning equities selectively; indeed, we can still identify numerous pockets of attractive opportunities for active and well-researched investors. However, unquestionably a real need for great active management, a risk management focus and differentiated portfolio management.

Disclaimer: This is a high level conceptual exercise and all figures are approximations using the CY2020 accounts.

In early 2010, Berkshire Hathaway finalised the acquisition of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), the largest US based railroad for the consideration of $26 billion for the stock it did not already own. This equated to a total deal value of $34 billion.

The consideration of $26 billion was paid with ~$16 billion in cash and the balance in Berkshire stock; with around $8 billion in debt drawn to partial fund the cash consideration. Broadly, this structure was in line with Berkshire's target leverage of around 30% against assets.

Berkshire's operandi modus is to let competent management teams run their businesses but enforcing strict capital discipline with a strong focus on cash generation to the parent company. Optimal capital allocation decisions result in a large advantage over time, which Berkshire personifies in many ways. 

Without digging too deeply into the operational performance since acquisition, it is clear that Berkshire purchased BNSF at a cyclical low with extraordinary timing; just as the post-GFC recovery was gaining momentum. The growth in top-line revenue has been anemic, with a rise of only around 25% over the 10 year period since acquisition. However, cost control, capital allocation and market conditions have been sound and allowed Berkshire to harvest outsized returns from the investment.

Since acquisition, Berkshire has invested $41 billion in capital expenditure offset by depreciation of $20 billion. This implies that BNSF may have been either 1) under-investing in capital items prior to Berkshire's acquisition or; 2) Berkshire have invested heavily in capital items due to a strategic rationale. 

The latest Berkshire shareholder letter provides some clues: "Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-long trains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they all the while encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massive flooding periodically occurs. BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spread throughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety and service throughout its vast system."

Whilst depreciation is a relatively stable portion of fixed assets; year-to-year capital expenditures can fluctuate more broadly depending on capital allocation decisions and any externalities that may impact the operations. In addition, given the relatively long-life nature of heavy fixed railway assets and the inexorable push of inflation over time; this effectively means that a dollar spent today, could mean over a dollar saved tomorrow in aggregate holistic costs.
Accordingly, we anticipate that BNSF will require a relatively lower capital requirement going forward, probably a figure closer to BNSF's depreciation and amortization expenses.

Incidently, this aggressive capital investment program has come about despite almost $42 billion in dividends paid to Berkshire over this time period. No doubt that a reasonable portion of this has come from levering up the balance sheet against new fixed assets against which Berkshire has greater certainty around their effective life. None-withstanding, this is a fantastic result against Berkshire's cost base of ~$30 billion. 

The largest component of value attributable to BNSF is the terminal value. The company's claimed equity value on its books is around $65 billion which looks to be under-valued on a standalone basis. For instance, BNSF's competitor, Union Pacific Corporation (UNP), is valued at around $154 billion at a capitalised dividend yield of approx 1.8%. 

I cannot say whether UNP has invested the minimum requisite capital expenditure necessary to keep its operations running smoothly, but I can say that BNSF's heavy capital investments provides it a good degree of certainty around its future capital requirements; so it's appropriate to use UNP's dividend yield as a basis for our standalone terminal value. 

For CY2020, a $5.8 billion dividend was paid by BNSF to Berkshire; we expect this to grow over time largely dependent on the sustaining capital requirements. Capitalising this dividend at a yield of 1.8%, provides us with a terminal value of $322 billion. If we are even more conservative and decide to use a 3% capitalisation figure, this provides us with a terminal value of around $193 billion. Both figures are vastly higher than BNSF's claimed book value of $65 billion.

Berkshire's overall return on BNSF has been over 28% per annum in our upper case and almost 23% in our lower case. It's actual return on equity is significantly higher; circa 32% and 27% in upper and lower cases.

These are extraordinary returns considering the size of the investment and truly demonstrate why the Berkshire team are considered the world's pre-eminent living investors.

In private debt funds - unlike in boutique equity funds - there is a big payoff for investors from having a bigger loan book. Scale makes private debt providers more relevant to borrowers and investors, says Metrics Managing Partner Andrew Lockhart.

Conventional wisdom says that by staying small, boutique managers can deliver superior returns. They are nimble and can move in and out of stocks without the burden of having to invest, even when conditions are not favourable.

But what is true of equity managers does not hold for private debt providers. Increased scale makes a private debt manager more relevant to both the borrowers and the investors and provides more consistent returns. In this article we look at the reasons why, using the Metrics Credit Partners experience to illustrate the benefits.

Metrics was established ten years ago, a pioneer in non-bank lending in Australia, by a team of three partners who worked at NAB and who had extensive experience in lending and portfolio risk management. Since then, Metrics has grown to a team of ~100 people with AUM of ~$10 billion. Metrics has not grown just for the sake of getting bigger, but because there are clear benefits for investors.

Having scale makes Metrics more relevant to borrowers because access to non-bank debt finance can help them grow. With increased funding, Metrics can lend larger volumes to clients to help realise their plans. A smaller lender may not always have the capacity to match the needs of some borrowers and they don't have the certainty of capital that a larger lender provides.

Metrics is not a bank. It is a minnow compared to the balance sheets of any of the Big Four. But  it does not have their cost structure or rigid business practices, either. As one of the largest non-bank providers of debt finance to Australian businesses Metrics has the capability to match the needs of borrowers in a way that banks cannot. There are regulatory restrictions which impose a higher level of capital to be retained on balance sheets for banks that lend to business compared with lending for consumer purposes where the loan is secured against a residential property. This reduces the returns that a bank can generate from lending to companies which reduces their appetite to do so. But Metrics is focused on business and real estate lending. It has a highly skilled and a professional team with a deep understanding of each borrower, which means they can assess risk and price it accordingly.

Through the recent wave of lockdowns that began in June 2021 Metrics again demonstrated its commitment to business borrowers. In the September quarter alone, Metrics financed in excess of $1.2 billion. By December, as the economy re-emerges from lockdowns, Metrics expects to finalise another $2 billion. It's unlikely any of our non-bank fund competitors can provide this volume of finance to Australian companies.

All through this period Metrics has further added depth and breadth of expertise, increasing its team ~100 people. By resourcing teams in origination and risk assessment it has a larger more diverse team to consider more lending opportunities. That in turn delivers more attractive returns and capital preservation for investors.

Contrast that with small private debt providers who claim to have the same benefits of a boutique equity investor. Their small scale means they can only do a handful of loans for a small number of clients before they reach capacity. That limits the potential of their borrowers. It also limits the managers ability to create diversified portfolios for their investors, increasing concentration and single large counterparty credit risk.

The big global credit players setting up shop in Australia have a similar scale problem. On the face of it they have huge resources and big, well-known brand names to offer the local market. But the reality is that their local teams are small and lack the capacity to originate many good lending opportunities. When they do find one, the credit decisions are usually taken offshore, away from the relationships and understanding of local nuances that a larger, local private debt manager like Metrics provides.

Being more relevant to borrowers has several important benefits for investors. Scale provides access to better deal flow, giving Metrics a better understanding of the market and the ability to focus on the best quality lending opportunities coming through. Having the ability to lend in larger size also means more negotiating power when determining the terms and conditions on the financing. It allows Metrics to tap sources of income - such as origination fees - that those smaller players cannot, generating better returns for investors.

Scale also provides important risk management capabilities for investors, by allowing diversification across a wide range of industries and sectors. A larger portfolio of loans, where each exposure represents less than 1% of the total, provides cover against any one loan having an outsized impact on the returns to investors. This is also important in preserving investor capital, reducing concentration risk from any one borrower.

Scale is only useful when it delivers better outcomes for borrowers and investors. Metrics' continued growth and performance reinforces this. This year alone, both listed funds have undertaken significant capital raisings to expand their capacity and continue to trade at a premium to their NAV. New additions to the Metrics suite of funds have and will continue to come to market to ensure those benefits of scale are realised for borrowers and investors alike.

When it comes to investing, does being boring ever pay off?

The contrarian approach to investing is not a new concept. If you want to generate returns better than the crowd, you need to be different. 

Against the backdrop of a tumultuous past year and a half, the easiest thing was to play it safe in the light of uncertainty. That's exactly what many people did, including some high-profile professional investors who converted their portfolios to cash in March 2020.

For us, being agile, open-minded and willing to be contrarian was more important than ever last year. It allowed us to invest in a collection of unloved businesses at once-in-a-lifetime prices. 

And it paid off. 

The 2021 financial year was the best on record for Forager across both our Australian Shares Fund and International Shares Fund. 

That was then, what about now? 

The current environment reminds me a lot of 2017. We had had a wonderful few years of outperformance leading up to that year, with many of our contrarian investments paying off handsomely. The following two years, however, were our two worst on record.

When I reflect on that 2018-2019 period, our biggest mistake was to keep being contrarian simply for the sake of it. I wrote an article at the end of 2017 that identified 10 blue chip stocks that made for a nice defensive portfolio in a generally expensive market. Not only did those 10 stocks perform well over the subsequent year, on average they outperformed our Australian Shares Fund by some 20%. 

There is a time and place for contrarian bets. And there's a time for playing it safe. 

Right now, interest rates remain at record lows, stock markets are trading at all-time highs, people are inventing new metrics like revenue multiples to justify absurd prices for growth stocks, inflation is becoming a serious concern and COVID resurgences are weighing on the economic recovery.

More importantly, there are very few pockets of undue pessimism. 

It is time, once again, to be thinking about the benefits of safe and boring. Once again, like 2017, investor obsession with hyper growth and high returns has left some of these stocks neglected.

The beauty of being big and boring

Let's take a look at two big and boring stocks currently in our Australian Shares Fund: Downer EDI and TPG Telecom.

Employing some 52,000 people in Australia and New Zealand, Downer Group is one of the antipodes' largest industrial services companies. Its operations range from maintaining buildings and railway lines through to building roads and runways for the defence force. 

If that sounds boring, that's the whole point. After a number of slip-ups in recent years, the company has been focussing on making itself as boring as possible. It has been winding down its higher-risk construction business, has offloaded most of its mining services businesses and sold its laundries operations for a tidy sum. By 2024, we estimate 80-90% of revenue will come from government-related entities. 

This transformation has gone largely unrewarded by investors. Up until its latest results were released in August, the share price was languishing at 2016 levels. We think it can generate an 8-9% cash return from these prices, is committed to sharing most of that cash with shareholders and should be able to generate growth in line with the wider economy. In a world of expensive assets, that adds up to just fine.

Telcos out of fashion

TPG is earlier in its transformation journey. The original TPG was a popular founder-led business which David Teoh built from the ground up and created a huge amount of shareholder value. 

His final act was to merge with Vodafone, much to Rod Sims ire. The ACCC Chairman didn't like the impact this merger could have on competition and the deal ended up in the courts. TPG won, the ACCC lost and the combined company is now a significant player with more than five million mobile subscribers and two million fixed broadband subscribers.

Teoh has now left the business and the days of rapid growth are well behind TPG. But we think the concerns Sims had about competition suggest a brighter future ahead for the sector.

On the fixed side of the business, margins have been compressed by the transition from reselling ADSL to lower margin NBN contracts. From here on, there is upside in potential NBN price cuts and the networks themselves are starting to bypass the NBN with home 5G wireless devices (my household uses one, it's super fast and was the easiest installation I have ever experienced).

And in mobile all three large players are talking about a "better" pricing environment, with all of them selling new contracts at better than the current average. Sims won't like that, but it is good news for shareholders. 

We think all of this adds up to a business that can generate a cash return of roughly 8% on today's market capitalisation. Unlike Downer, we might need to wait a few years while TPG repays some debt, but shareholders should see most of that paid out as dividends from the 2023 financial year. 

The telco sector is mature, boring and stable, but we will take 8% over most of the opportunities we are seeing today. 

The lesson: you don't always need to be different

Forager's motto is "opportunity in unlikely places". It's an approach that has served us well over the past decade. Despite the odd year of poor performance, our clients are still well ahead of the index since our Australian Fund's inception in 2009. 

We have learned an important lesson from those difficult years, though. You don't always need to be doing better than the crowd.

Keeping it simple is not always easy. Especially when, like us, you have a reputation for being contrarian. To turn to our loyal client base and say "you know how we look for opportunity in unlikely places?". Well, we just bought Downer EDI. That doesn't sit well with how we view ourselves or what our clients have come to expect. And that's what makes it so hard.

But we know how important it is. The contrarian's time will come again. And, while we wait, boring stocks like Downer and TPG can give us some perfectly sensible returns.

Written by Chief Investment Officer Steve Johnson

The three banks with September financial years - ANZ, NAB and Westpac - are almost back to normal. Cash profits and return on equity are still below FY19 levels, but it is clear that the COVID-19 crisis has not left any scars on the banking system. Most importantly, the banks' capital positions are once again "unquestionably strong": an average Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 12.7%, up from 11.4% in FY20, means that all the banks can afford share buybacks.

So far, however, organic growth is modest. Most of the recovery in cash earnings came from the $820m writeback of provisions built up last year. The banks are still paying "customer remediation costs" for their crimes of fees for no service and other horrors revealed by the Hayne Royal Commission, but these should end in FY22. The ratio of operating costs to income is still too high, and the banks will need another two to three years to achieve their cost reduction targets.

The fundamental problem is that banking is no longer as profitable as it used to be, thanks to increased competition, tighter regulation, and higher capital requirements. The KPMG chart below shows how the banks' average net interest margin (NIM) has slid steadily downward, from 3.0% two decades ago to only 1.86% now.

In order to preserve their margins, the banks need to simultaneously cut their operating costs and increase their capital spending to improve their processes. CBA is leading the pack in both of these objectives, which is why it is the only one of the Big Four to have returned to its 2016 share price. Shareholders of the other three banks are well aware of the size of their capital losses over the last five years. This is also why CBA's dividend yield is less than 4.0% while the other three yield between 4.5% and 5.0%.

FY22 results are likely to be similar to this year - modest organic growth, with profits buoyed by provision writebacks. But there will be complications. The first is that wholesale funding costs will increase as US and Australian interest rates rise, and the banks will lose some of the deposit inflow which was triggered by the COVID-19 panic. The second is that the Australian regulators will probably impose macroprudential controls to slow the pace of house price rises and to discourage borrowers from taking on excessive debt. The third is that the rise in CPI inflation will affect different sectors of the Australian economy in different ways, and may put an end to the improvement in loan delinquency rates.

Our analysis suggests that the banks are fairly priced at present, as a sector with low earnings growth but also low risk. In the long run, the recent changes in industry structure will mean that bank earnings will grow more slowly than most companies in the S&P/ASX200 Index, making the banks attractive for income rather than capital growth.

ANZ's cash profit of $6.2bn (218c per share) slightly exceeded market expectations, because stronger markets income offset a 4% increase in costs as well as ongoing customer remediation costs. The full-year dividend of 142c was higher than 60c in FY20 but still below 160c in FY19. During the latest half-year, ANZ's residential loan book declined by 1% against system growth of 4%. This disparity highlights the inadequacies of ANZ's mortgage processing systems, which the bank has acknowledged and is devoting capex to improving. FY22 earnings and dividends are expected to be flat, but ANZ is trading on a lower P/E than the other three, so the medium term may see some price gains through re-rating.

Commonwealth Bank's trading update for the September quarter disappointed the market, with the CBA share price falling 8%. Despite above-system loan growth, cash profit for the quarter was flat at $2.2bn and net interest margin fell significantly. A single quarter is not necessarily an indicator of the 2022 result, but it does reinforce our view that the banks face a difficult competitive environment.

NAB reported a $6.6bn cash profit (199c per share) and lifted its full-year dividend to 127c (a 64% payout ratio), which was better than 60c in FY20 but still below 166c in FY19. The result was free of notable items and other one-offs. Management indicated that future dividends would be 65% to 75% of cash earnings. During the half-year, NAB grew its gross loans and advances (GLA) as fast as system growth or faster. The bank has simplified and automated its mortgage approval process: 30% of Simple Home Loans are expected to be approved in one hour, and 60% within one day.

Westpac is lagging behind the other three big banks. FY21 cash earnings of $5.4bn (146c per share) are equivalent to a return on equity of 7.6%, well behind the Big Four average of 9.9%. Westpac's cash earnings suffered from a notable items charge of $1.6bn, and the September 2021 half year was disappointing, with expenses rising and margins falling. The FY22 dividend of 118c (an 81% payout ratio) was better than 31c in FY20 but well below 174c in FY19. The share price has fallen 9% since the result - the market clearly does not believe that Westpac will achieve its announced cost reduction targets on time.