10k Words - September 2021

Equitable Investors

8 September 2021

Funds operated by this manager:

Equitable Investors Dragonfly Fund

To invest or not to invest in China?

Robert Swift, Delft Partners

September 2021

Investing in China remains a moral question, but to not invest now because of more government intervention and capricious legislation is illogical, since that would be to ignore the fact that these trends are clearly evident in other countries. More government, capricious and unexpected legislation to the apparent detriment of companies and shareholders, is now omnipresent as a global systemic risk to equity returns. Consequently, prepare for lower rates of profit growth and 'fatter' tails in your investment outcomes, even if you decide to never invest in China again.

There are similarities between Xi Jinping's increasing intervention in the Chinese corporate sector and those by Western governments

1. Policy with social objectives (with a lack of awareness that the years of free money created the wealth inequality in the first place)

2. More taxation and worryingly more centrally directed capital allocation and subsidies (Tesla anyone?)

3. Penalising 'rentier capital' aka private savings 

4. Population coercion to behave by scare tactics/messaging, and surveillance; China uses facial recognition software and 'social scores' (but you may care to read this: Amnesty - New York Police Facial Recognition Revealed)

At least China has finally done something about moral hazard which would still seem to be prevalent in 'the West'. China Evergrande is 95% certain to default on over $80bn of bonds and we'll have to see how that pain gets allocated between locals and foreigners before making more judgements, but bankruptcy is part of capitalism, or it used to be. In this respect China is ahead of the US perhaps and certainly the Europeans in letting a failed enterprise actually fail.

For those of you who think that China's decision making comes without due warning and therefore makes it too risky in which to invest, the second part of the US 'Infrastructure' bill, equal to a 3.5tln $ spend, will take 17 days (!) to debate. Obamacare took 9 months even with a significant Democrat majority, (which is not the case now) and FDR's programmes were spread over his first 2 terms - 8 years. The UK government recently announced hikes on national insurance and dividend tax increases in essentially a unilateral decision by the prime minister. The unelected European Central Bank has essentially decided both monetary and fiscal policy for Europe and the result has been less than stellar growth. The Euro remains a political construct not a valid economic one but it's an ideology akin to 'Mao thought' and so on we go regardless.

In short, governments everywhere are consulting less and intervening more quickly.

Government exist to provide essential services but to also redress other imbalances dangerous to national cohesion - or they should. Currently imbalances are very evident in wealth inequality and the share of profits in the economy relative to wages. Using the US data (the best around) we can see from the chart below that corporate profits have been on a rising trend relative to wages. Since the consumers of the companies' products need money with which to buy them, this % allocation tends to oscillate around an average. If wages rise too quickly then companies become less profitable, can't invest and won't hire which the reduces wage growth. Vice versa. Sometimes a nudge is needed - the General Strikes in the 1920s, the Reagan, Thatcher, Laffer curve revolution of the late 1970s and the Schroeder reforms in Germany in the 1990s serve as examples.

Source: BEA, BLS

This swing back to wages is needed and will come with the attendant ever bigger government. Don't blame government - blame companies that have indulged in such anti-social behaviour as zero contract hours, and paying no taxes while enjoying the legal protection, trained workforce, and infrastructure that other people's taxes have provided. Could this have been prevented in the last few years had companies perhaps not bought back stock to the tune of c$900bn p.a., significantly benefitting corporate executive share option schemes, and instead raised wages, increased re-investment and improved job security? This imbalance got a big tailwind from ZIRP aka "monetary policy for rich people", and so we would actually view this shift as much need rebalance because without the rebalance...economic distress causes revolutions and if you want examples checkout Wikipedia -The_Great_Wave

Two final thoughts.

Trickle-down economics is dead and as investors you should prepare for more government, National Industrial Polices, thus more inflation and taxation and lower returns from equities. Our advice is to focus on smaller companies since they are seldom directly in the firing line of legislation, find companies that do 'useful things' such as building a country's capital stock, look very closely at Japan which we think is both cheap and showing change for the good, and increase the volatility of returns if you do such things as portfolio optimisations.
The moral issue of investing in China requires consistency. If you don't like the idea of benefitting from profits made in China's repressive regime, shouldn't that dislike include profits made in China regardless of the geographical listing and domicile of the company?  

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One way or another China is always in the news. The current nervousness by some fund managers surrounding China is a reflection of the risks involved, while others see resulting lower prices as an opportunity.

In this video Chris Gosselin explores both sides of the argument with Rob Swift from Delft Partners, Jack Dwyer from Conduit Capital, and Alex Pollak from Loftus Peak.

Damen Purcell, COO of Australian Fund Monitors, speaks with Jonathan Wu, Executive Director at Premium China Funds Management.  

The Premium Asia Income Fund began in August 2011 and has achieved an annualised return since then of 9.63% with an annualised volatility of 5.52%. The Fund's up-capture and down-capture ratios (since inception), 132% and -60% respectively, highlight its capacity to significantly outperform over the long-term regardless of market direction.  

Funds operated by this manager: Premium Asia Income Fund, Premium Asia Fund, Premium China Fund

Best and Less Group Case Study:

How Do Private Equity Managers Make Money?

Vantage Asset Management

03 September, 2021

In the third of our case studies on how Private Equity managers make money and the importance of exits (Part 1, Part 2) we will examine a recent transaction that highlights opportunities that exist to transform assets that do not form part of a larger organisation's core strategy.

Turnaround opportunities often represent the higher risk/return opportunities in the Private Equity universe, however a distressed business can present a great buying opportunity to a Private Equity manager where they have a unique insight into what the problems plaguing a business are and have a clear thesis on how those problems can be rectified.

In a 2016 study by McKinsey "How private-equity owners lean into turnarounds", a comparison of the performance of 659 Private Equity backed and publicly owned businesses recovering from a distressed situation showed that the Private Equity backed firms recovered significantly faster than public counterparts.  Their study showed that Private Equity backed firms on average recovered their EBITDA margin within 18 months of a negative quarter, much faster than public firms.  McKinsey attributed this to Private Equity owners holding management teams accountable for driving a turnaround and the speed at which Private Equity backed firms decide upon and in turn, implement turnaround strategies.

But not all turnaround opportunities come in the form of distressed businesses.  Sometimes opportunity comes in the form of an "unloved" or non-core asset within a larger business that is undertaking a strategic change in direction.

CASE STUDY: BEST AND LESS GROUP

The Best & Less business was founded by Berel Ginges and opened its first store in Parramatta in 1965. Best & Less predominately sold basic products (socks, underpants, tea towels, t-shirts, etc.) and was known for its frugal in-store appearance, with minimal fixtures, and an advertising slogan of "You don't pay for any fancy overheads". Like most successful Australian retailers at that time, Best & Less opened new stores and transitioned into a national retailer.

In 2012 Best & Less' ("BLG") new owner Pepkor put in place a new management team to reposition BLG and improve financial performance. As part of a renewed focus on product, BLG's strategy evolved, with the aim to be "famous for the baby and kids' categories" as well as for underwear. New design, buying and planning capability was added into these functional areas and purchasing directly from manufacturers increased.

Further transformation of the business progressed from 2016 when the current CEO Rodney Orrock joined the business however after the acquisition of Pepkor by Steinhoff International, Best & Less was integrated into Steinhoff International's Australian furniture division which included the Freedom Group. During this period, BLG operated within a group that had a different focus in respect to strategic, operational and financial outcomes as well as capital allocation. Important elements of the BLG transformation program were put on hold, trading and inventory decisions were affected and sales and profits were adversely impacted, especially in FY19.

Steinhoff International, through its Australian subsidiary Greenlit Brands, divested BLG to Allegro Funds in December 2019 after a strategic review of its holdings.  Allegro Funds then put in place an experienced Chair to oversee the delivery of three significant outcomes:

1. Separate Best & Less Group from Greenlit Brands and take control of its own strategy
2. Accelerate the disrupted transformation program
3. Set a more ambitious growth strategy

During the period following Allegro Funds' acquisition, BLG successfully established itself as a standalone business, accelerated its business transformation and traded through COVID-19, during which BLG experienced continued sales growth. This occurred by bringing focus on the following key areas:

• understanding the customer;
• attracting traffic to each channel;
• growing the baby and kids' categories;
• ensuring that online sales were profitable;
• increasing the Friends Club database while concurrently upgrading the customer relationship management (CRM) capability;
• improving productivity;
• optimising the store portfolio; and
• improving the performance of Postie by introducing the key elements of the Best & Less brand to the Postie offer.

Under Allegro's turnaround program BLG has repositioned from a discount retailer to a value apparel specialty retailer with a 245-physical store network in Australia and New Zealand and an online platform across its two brands:

• Best & Less (in Australia); and
• Postie (in New Zealand).

With approximately 50% of product sales being in the baby and kids' categories, BLG aims to be the "Number One" choice for mothers buying baby and kids' value apparel in Australia and New Zealand.  Revenues have increased from $608.7m in FY19 to $663.2m in FY21, which includes a remarkable doubling of online sales in the last two years.  More impressively,  EBITDA was reported at $71.6m for FY21 up from $24.5m in FY19 and an increase of 165.2% for the year.  This validates the effectiveness of the changes that Allegro and the management team put in place.

During July 2021, Allegro completed the successful exit of BLG via an IPO. Best & Less Group (ASX: BST) listed on 26 July 2021 at a share price of $2.16, giving it a market capitalisation of $271m. Pleasingly BST has continued to perform since listing up 63c from its listing price at the end of August off the back of recent results well in excess of prospectus forecasts.  Once fully completed the exit will deliver Allegro fund investors, including VPEG3, with top tier performing returns across a 1.7-year investment period. 

If you would like to share in the growth and ultimate returns derived from similar small to mid-market company investments, Vantage Private Equity Growth Fund 4 ("VPEG4") remains open until 30 September 2021.

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 A very good business

Aitken Investment Management

September 2021

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 7 Easy Ways to Get Hurt

Yarra Capital Management

August 2021

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Higher inflation can be a friend to real estate investors

Quay Global Investors

August 2021

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Chris Gosselin, CEO of Australian Fund Monitors, speaks with Graeme Carson, Director & Portfolio Manager at Cyan Investment Management.

The Cyan C3G Fund has a track record of 7 years and has outperformed the ASX Small Ordinaries Total Return Index since inception in July 2014, providing investors with a return of 15.58% per annum, compared with the index's return of 9.42% p.a. over the same period. The manager has delivered this outperformance while maintaining a down-capture ratio since inception of 52%, indicating that, on average, it has only fallen half as much as the market during the market's negative months.

Funds operated by manager: Cyan C3G Fund

Is your fund manager skilful or just lucky?

Andrew Mitchell, Ophir Asset Management

August 2021

There is no doubt in the world of sport that the likes of 20-time tennis Grand Slam winner Roger Federer outperforms because of skill, not luck. When investors evaluate the performance of equity funds, however, it's not as obvious which funds are skilled or have just been lucky.

Fund manager league tables were recently released for the last financial year, and the media, as usual, trumpeted funds with hot performance.

But now is a particularly difficult time for investors to assess fund managers. With markets rising, some funds have just been lucky and ridden strong gains. There is now a danger that investors chase these hot, lucky funds and become saddled with poorly performing investments for years.

In this article we outline how investors can try to tell which funds managers have 'skill' - and can be expected to keep outperforming for a long time - and those that are simply 'lucky' and likely to disappoint when markets change.

If investors can spot the difference, they are significantly more likely to choose the right fund for them, a fund that delivers sustained performance, and a fund that ultimately helps them reach their financial and lifestyle goals.

The skilled few

The big problem for investors is that few funds are truly skilled.

In a 2014 report on equity investing, Willis Towers Watson, the global investment consulting firm, argued that only 10 per cent of fund managers could be considered genuinely skilled over the long term, while 70 per cent show mediocre performance and 20 per cent are inferio

The fact that so few managers were deemed truly talented is a product of the multiple forces which influence portfolio performance, such as:

• Being lucky
• Gambling on high-risk stocks during a rising market
• Having exposure to the right investment style at the right time
• Taking on hidden risks like selling put options
• Being skilled

Obviously, managers that perform via the first four should be avoided. But how can we tell who has the right qualities to be considered genuinely talented managers?

4 attributes of the skilled

Although no specific rule book exists on how this should be judged, we believe that skilled investors have four characteristics in common.

1. They perform through time

The number one attribute of skilled investment managers is their performance over time. By studying this, we can observe if performance has aligned with their intended investment style. For example, if they are a "Growth" style manager have they tended to perform well when that style is in favour? If they are an "all -weather" manager, have they been able to perform well through all different kinds of market environments? We can also measure how persistent returns have been across different stages of the market cycle.

2. They have a high number of winning bets

One should also study the number of bets made over time. A manager who makes many bets over time, and wins a reasonable number of them, deserves to be rated far higher than a manager whose success is solely attributable to one or two knockouts. The former manager has been tested more times, and hence we can be more confident in their ability to replicate that success in the future.

3. They are on a quest for "better"

Besides just looking at each manager's track record of returns, those with skill at investing have an attitude to their craft that combines intensity, flexibility, and humility. These managers have a passion for investing and are constantly striving to put in the work to become more skilled investors.

4. They accept the role of chance

At the same time, best-in-class investors are aware of the role of chance in their investment outcomes and don't try to paint their success as pre-ordained. By contrast, fund managers who don't realise how much chance impacts their results can end up being painfully stubborn or arrogant. And when the environmental variables that help outperformance eventually stop, a humble manager is more likely to adapt and evolve their process commensurately.

The harsh reality is that even a skilled investment manager will underperform at times, and an unskilled manager can outperform, potentially even for years. Still, the longer the period over which a given investment manager delivers superior performance, and the larger the investment base involved, the more likely the results reflect skill rather than luck. To put this another way, over time as an investor becomes more skilful, their performance should become more consistent.

Like medical research

So how do professional fund manager selectors statistically test whether a fund manager's performance is truly different from their benchmark, or the market?

They perform tests similar to the type medical researchers use to test whether a drug's treatment of a condition is statistically different from a placebo.

A simplified example of this test is below:

Where:

T = the so-called 'test statistic'

X = is a measure of the outperformance (if positive) or underperformance (if negative) of the fund versus the benchmark. (Note: providing the benchmark is 'risk-equivalent' to the Fund)

N = is a measure of how long the fund has been going for

S = is a measure of the volatility of the outperformance or underperformance of the manager through time

A 'test statistic' greater than about 2 means you have 95%+ confidence that the manager's outperformance or underperformance is different to zero. This level of confidence is the most commonly used to determine if something is truly different from its comparator or baseline.

3 takeaways

What you can quickly see is that both the greater the size of the outperformance and the longer the manager's track record are both positive attributes. Also, the lower the volatility of the outperformance, the more likely that outperformance is 'statistically significant' (different to zero) and due to skill rather than luck.

Some takeaways from this are:

1. You should pay less attention to 12-month returns reported by the press in the newspaper because returns this short have a greater potential to be due to luck, rather than 3, 5 or 10-year returns.
2. The larger the outperformance, the more likely this is to be due to skill, which can sometimes make up for a short track record. A word of warning though on this one: It is a good idea to test whether a manager has simply been 'punting' the fund and has made a big lottery-type payoff on one, or a small number of bets, or whether it is due to a broader series of unrelated investments.
3. Smaller, consistent outperformance may potentially be more likely to be due to skill than large, but volatile outperformance. There is a trade-off here.

Secretly skewing to small caps

More sophisticated statistical tests also exist to help ensure managers aren't simply outperforming by taking more risk than is embedded in the benchmark or market they are trying to outperform. A manager, for example, might claim outperformance during a bull market, but they only outperformed because they used leverage in their fund to increase its risk, and hence returns, in that market environment.

Finally, we need to question whether a fund's investment returns represent exposure that could be obtained at a much lower cost by investing through passive-type products. In such instances, there is no need to pay fees to a skilful investment manager to access these returns.

For example, small-cap equities, which is our space, have tended to outperform large-caps across many different equity markets over long periods of time. Investors should turn their nose up at large-cap managers who skew their funds to small caps, and where their small cap holdings have accounted for a meaningful share of their outperformance over their large-cap benchmarks.

Sorting the skilled from the plain lucky

To summarise, it is clear there is much to think about when trying to determine whether a manager's returns have been due to skill rather than luck.

Hopefully we have dissuaded you though from putting too much weight on a manager's short term annual returns reported in the so-called 'leagues tables' in the press!

At Ophir we judge the performance of our funds, and our analysts who contribute to it, primarily on its size, duration, consistency, and number of unrelated positions that have led to the result. We also seek to control for excessive risks that could jeopardise absolute performance over the long run.

As long-time readers will know, we think there are two other key criteria that help the skill of any manager shine through:

1. Alignment: nothing focuses your mind and skills like having your own money on the line when investing. As Charlie Munger has said: "Show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome". Having a significant percentage of your own wealth at risk we believe increases the incentive to perform well.
2. Capacity constraints: Size kills performance. Managing a lot of money is hard - it can impact your nimbleness and force you to operate in more efficient markets that are more difficult to outperform in. As Warren Buffett has said: "Anyone who says that size does not hurt investment performance is selling". A skilled manager who has been outperforming for years can quickly turn into an apparently unskilled manager whose performance drops off when they start managing a lot more money.

There are of course many other factors to consider as well when trying to disentangle the skilled from the unskilled, but the above is what we consider to be some of the most important here at Ophir.

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