"Given the distinct features of varied infrastructure assets, with active management a listed infrastructure equity portfolio can be positioned to take advantage of the long-term structural opportunity set, as well as whatever near-term cyclical events may prevail - whether they be environmental, political, economic or social."
NEWS
18 Aug 2022 - Performance Report: Delft Partners Global High Conviction Strategy
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Fund Overview | The quantitative model is proprietary and designed in-house. The critical elements are Valuation, Momentum, and Quality (VMQ) and every stock in the global universe is scored and ranked. Verification of the quant model scores is then cross checked by fundamental analysis in which a company's Accounting policies, Governance, and Strategic positioning is evaluated. The manager believes strategy is suited to investors seeking returns from investing in global companies, diversification away from Australia and a risk aware approach to global investing. It should be noted that this is a strategy in an IMA format and is not offered as a fund. An IMA solution can be a more cost and tax effective solution, for clients who wish to own fewer stocks in a long only strategy. |
Manager Comments | The Delft Partners Global High Conviction Strategy has a track record of 11 years and has outperformed the Global Equity Index since inception in August 2011, providing investors with an annualised return of 14.27% compared with the index's return of 12.88% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the strategy has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 11 years since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the strategy's largest drawdown was -8.81% vs the index's -15.77%, and since inception in August 2011 the strategy's largest drawdown was -13.33% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -15.77%. The strategy's maximum drawdown began in February 2020 and lasted 1 year, reaching its lowest point during July 2020. The strategy had completely recovered its losses by February 2021. During this period, the index's maximum drawdown was -13.19%. The Manager has delivered these returns with 1.15% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 four times over the past five years and which currently sits at 1.06 since inception. The strategy has provided positive monthly returns 88% of the time in rising markets and 14% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 96% and a down-capture ratio of 90%. |
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18 Aug 2022 - Performance Report: Quay Global Real Estate Fund (Unhedged)
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Fund Overview | The Fund will invest in a number of global listed real estate companies, groups or funds. The investment strategy is to make investments in real estate securities at a price that will deliver a real, after inflation, total return of 5% per annum (before costs and fees), inclusive of distributions over a longer-term period. The Investment Strategy is indifferent to the constraints of any index benchmarks and is relatively concentrated in its number of investments. The Fund is expected to own between 20 and 40 securities, and from time to time up to 20% of the portfolio maybe invested in cash. The Fund is $A un-hedged. |
Manager Comments | The Quay Global Real Estate Fund (Unhedged) has a track record of 6 years and 7 months and has outperformed the BBAREIT Index since inception in January 2016, providing investors with an annualised return of 7.75% compared with the index's return of 6.44% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has only experienced a negative annual return once in the 6 years and 7 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -17.04% vs the index's -12.05%, and since inception in January 2016 the fund's largest drawdown was -19.68% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -23.56%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in February 2020 and lasted 1 year and 4 months, reaching its lowest point during September 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by June 2021. The Manager has delivered these returns with 1.05% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 four times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.59 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 72% of the time in rising markets and 34% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 68% and a down-capture ratio of 66%. |
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18 Aug 2022 - Fundmonitors.com Spotlight - Past Performance Indicates Something... | 17 Aug 2022
Fundmonitors.com Spotlight - Past Performance Indicates Something… FundMonitors.com 17 August 2022 |
One of the benefits of working at FundMonitors.com is the easy access to data on over 700 funds, and to be able to analyse different concepts for fund analysis and portfolio construction. This can also be a drawback as it's easy to go down "data" rabbit holes trying to prove or disprove one concept or another. Recently we tested a portfolio that invested in those funds which performed best (based on returns) over the previous year, and then rebalanced at the end of year to a new list of the best performing funds. The premise of this idea is that the best performing funds in any year will continue to perform for 1-2 years, but accepting the reality that few funds remain on a "top ten" list every year. Using the Portfolio Builder on FundMonitors.com, we created a portfolio in July 2017 with the 10 best performing funds in the previous 12 months (July 2016-June 2017). We then rebalanced the portfolio every 12 months in July, investing in the 10 best performers in each of the previous 12 months. The results were interesting. Very few funds appeared in consecutive years, or more than once, and the geographic and sector exposure changed each year. Asian Equity Funds dominated in the 17/18 year, and the following year quality focused funds formed the bulk of exposure. Funds investing in the small and emerging sector made up the bulk of the portfolio's exposure the year to June 2020, followed by an increase in growth funds in the year to June 2021. The 21/22 year was dominated by funds investing in the tech sector, simply because of that sector's strong performance in the previous 12 months to June 2020. The outcome of the portfolio was a return of just 3.17% p.a. over 5 years with volatility of 26.36%, and a maximum drawdown of -47.64% in June 2022 thanks to the end of the tech sector's boom in November/December 2021. The graph below shows the portfolio's performance versus the ASX 200 Total Return and the S&P 500 Total Return benchmarks.
To be fair, there were periods, particularly from July 2020 to December 2021 that the portfolio performed well, but the overall result, particularly in the 12 months to June 2022 was disappointing. However, what happens if we used longer term performance periods as a guide and didn't rebalance? Once again, using the Portfolio Analysis tool on FundMonitors.com, we constructed 2 portfolios, one comprised of the 10 top performing funds over a 5 year period to June 2017, and another with the 10 top funds over 3 years to June 2017. This time there was no rebalancing with the portfolio left to grow over the next 5 years to June 2022. As you can see from the cumulative graph below both portfolios managed to beat the ASX 200 Total Return benchmark but underperformed the S&P 500 Total Return Benchmark. Top performance means different things to different investors, and ignores ratios and KPI's such as Sharpe and Sortino, which adjust for risk. What about a portfolio made up of the 10 funds that had the highest 5 year up capture ratio in June 2017, or a portfolio of the 10 funds with the highest 5 year Sortino Ratio?
The portfolio using the 10 funds with the highest Sortino Ratio shows some promising performance in this graph given the relatively low volatility. The portfolio only marginally underperformed the Australian Equity market with standard deviation of just 5.32% compared to 15.25% for the benchmark. For risk averse investors this might be an attractive option. There were a variety of conclusions from the various approaches: Certainly the most obvious is that chasing last year's "star" performers is not guarantee of future performance - if anything the opposite is the case as sector performance changes with the current economic and market conditions. Another is that rebalancing based on a specific time frame - in our case at the end of each financial year - ignores changes in the market. Finally "performance" means different things to different investors. For those just chasing high returns, accept that higher volatility frequently comes with it. Undoubtedly the disclaimers are right…past performance is not an indicator of future performance. Careful research, diversification and an eye on the market and macro environment are essential. Over the coming months we will continue to build out examples of portfolios created using the FundMonitors.com analysis tools. In the meantime, access to the Portfolio Builder is available to Premium Subscribers of FundMonitors.com and for those who want more information on what this tool can do, please have a look at this video. |
18 Aug 2022 - Private Credit: Differentiated Performance in the Midst of Rising Interest Rates
17 Aug 2022 - Performance Report: Insync Global Quality Equity Fund
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Fund Overview | Insync invests in a concentrated portfolio of high quality companies that possess long 'runways' of future growth benefitting from Megatrends. Megatrends are multiyear structural and disruptive changes that transform the way we live our daily lives and result from a convergence of different underlying trends including innovation, politics, demographics, social attitudes and lifestyles. They provide important tailwinds to individual stocks and sectors, that reside within them. Insync believe this delivers exponential earnings growth ahead of market expectations. Insync screens the universe of 40,000 listed global companies to just 150 that it views as superior. This includes profitability, balance sheet performance, shareholder focus and valuations. 20-40 companies are then chosen for the portfolio. These reflect the best outcomes from further analysis using a proprietary DCF valuation, implied growth modelling, and free cash flow yield; alongside management, competitor, and industry scrutiny. The Fund may hold some cash (maximum of 5%), derivatives, currency contracts for hedging purposes, and American and/or Global Depository Receipts. It is however, for all intents and purposes, a 'long-only' fund, remaining fully invested irrespective of market cycles. |
Manager Comments | The Insync Global Quality Equity Fund has a track record of 12 years and 10 months and has outperformed the Global Equity Index since inception in October 2009, providing investors with an annualised return of 12.04% compared with the index's return of 10.65% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has only experienced a negative annual return once in the 12 years and 10 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -27.21% vs the index's -15.77%, and since inception in October 2009 the fund's largest drawdown was -27.21% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -15.77%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in January 2022 and has lasted 6 months, reaching its lowest point during June 2022. The Manager has delivered these returns with 1.53% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.84 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 82% of the time in rising markets and 20% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 85% and a down-capture ratio of 87%. |
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17 Aug 2022 - Performance Report: Bennelong Kardinia Absolute Return Fund
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Fund Overview | There is a slight bias to large cap stocks on the long side of the portfolio, although in a rising market the portfolio will tend to hold smaller caps, including resource stocks, more frequently. On the short side, the portfolio is particularly concentrated, with stock selection limited by both liquidity and the difficulty of borrowing stock in smaller cap companies. Short positions are only taken when there is a high conviction view on the specific stock. The Fund uses derivatives in a limited way, mainly selling short dated covered call options to generate additional income. These typically have less than 30 days to expiry, and are usually 5% to 10% out of the money. ASX SPI futures and index put options can be used to hedge the portfolio's overall net position. The Fund's discretionary investment strategy commences with a macro view of the economy and direction to establish the portfolio's desired market exposure. Following this detailed sector and company research is gathered from knowledge of the individual stocks in the Fund's universe, with widespread use of broker research. Company visits, presentations and discussions with management at CEO and CFO level are used wherever possible to assess management quality across a range of criteria. |
Manager Comments | The Bennelong Kardinia Absolute Return Fund has a track record of 16 years and 3 months and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in May 2006, providing investors with an annualised return of 7.64% compared with the index's return of 6.11% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 16 years and 3 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -10.52% vs the index's -11.9%, and since inception in May 2006 the fund's largest drawdown was -11.71% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -47.19%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in June 2018 and lasted 2 years and 6 months, reaching its lowest point during December 2018. The fund had completely recovered its losses by December 2020. During this period, the index's maximum drawdown was -26.75%. The Manager has delivered these returns with 6.61% less volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.64 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 87% of the time in rising markets and 32% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 15% and a down-capture ratio of 55%. |
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17 Aug 2022 - A look at the poster child for Owner-Managed
A look at the poster child for Owner-Managed Airlie Funds Management July 2022 |
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My love affair with owner-managed businesses began back in the mid-1990s when I was in my 20s, and naturally as one imagines at that age, an investing genius. Surely sensing my potential, my bosses allocated me a 'small-cap' company to cut my teeth on as an analyst (read: limit any potential damage to portfolios). The trading liquidity of the company was low, and it did not get a lot of airtime among the bigger, sexier companies. I took a good look at the company, reading all the (hard copy!) annual reports, and got a sense for the underlying quality of the business. The company - Reece Limited - was outwardly pretty boring - a plumbing wholesaler that was majority-owned by the Wilson family, a family that had no interest in spruiking the stock to pump up the share price. This put them at odds with 90% of other companies on the bourse, and pretty much all my experience of management teams thus far. Over a few years, we slowly but surely accumulated enough stock in Reece to make it a meaningful holding in the portfolio. The results had been impressive, with the company growing profits at a meaningful clip and the share price following. So, expectations were high leading into another half-year result when I excitedly printed the results out - sales were up meaningfully! Double digit! ... but net profit was down ... meaningfully! To better understand my consternation, perhaps a slight detour on how the market operates and concentrates on short-term performance. There ... that is the detour. In my experience, the market was (still is!) ONLY interested in the right here and now, and it wants profit growth NOW and the promise today of more of the same into the future with no detours taken along the way. The reward? A nice upward path for the share price. In my experience as an analyst to that point, this is what companies strove for each half year and they would move hell and high water to achieve it, egged on by market participants (buy and sell sides). The poster child at the time was US-listed General Electric with the lauded Jack Welch as CEO. It turns out the remarkable quarter-over-quarter profit growth that GE produced was an illusion, but that is another story. "My love affair with owner-managed businesses began back in the mid-1990s when I was in my 20s."So, I frantically looked at this profit result from Reece with a growing sense of sickness in my stomach - costs were way higher than the previous period, in my mind destroying a beautiful sales result. The 'market' in its short-term wisdom declared this a poor result and reacted accordingly. The stock fell. Now as I have mentioned, Reece was majority-owned by the Wilson family, with ownership of over 70% of the shares on issue. The family did not communicate much with the market, nor frankly did it seem to care what a bunch of financial analysts thought about how the company was run, rightly so as we'll see below. However, in my infinite wisdom I was determined to tell CEO Alan Wilson what was what, and didn't he understand the purpose of producing half-yearly profit growth numbers? Hadn't he heard of operating leverage? So, with more patience and politeness than I deserved, Wilson heard me out and further explained the strategy that was already laid out briefly in the result commentary (had I bothered to read it). Where I saw a cost blow-out, he saw great opportunities for investment to grow - simply, rolling out the Reece store network in more locations around Australia, taking market share, and becoming ubiquitous within plumbing and bathroom. I hung up the call having learnt a valuable lesson. Now I had dutifully read the Warren Buffett letters and paid lip service to buying 'pieces of companies' not 'lottery tickets,' but in the cut and thrust of everyday markets, I too had absorbed the focus on the short term. The penny dropped that Wilson was investing now for future growth, and that the opportunity could be massive. Now around that time in the late 1990s, Reece was actually half the size of the big player in the market - Tradelink (owned by the mini-conglomerate Crane Group). The chart below shows that Reece was half Tradelink's size in terms of sales and profits. Reece versus TradelinkQuality of Management: Benefits of an owner-managed business
Source: Company reports Fast forward more than 20 years and Wilson's strategy has played out perfectly. From a relatively unknown company based in Victoria, the Reece name has become synonymous with plumbing and bathrooms nationwide. The chart below shows the result - sales in Australia/New Zealand up 8x and profits up 22x. Amazing results and all without raising any equity (until its expansion into the US in 2018) or meaningful debt. In fact, the company acquired property sites for a lot of its best-located stores along the way. Meanwhile, you can see what happened to Tradelink - 23 lost years where sales went nowhere, and profits backwards - overseen by numerous management teams and a new corporate owner (Fletcher Building).
Source: Company reports Which now brings us to the lesson in all this. Standing in 1998, armed only with sales and profits of Reece versus Tradelink, traditional business theory would usually predict Tradelink would go on to dominate, given it had a larger store base and hence larger sales base to generate economies-of-scale benefits, etc. Yet we see that an owner-managed business can meaningfully outperform a competitor. Why might this be the case? Firstly, it's worth defining how we think of owner-managed businesses. We break our definition into two groups:
So why can companies that fit these definitions do so well? We believe it comes down to three fairly obvious factors:
Using Reece as an example and running the company through the three factors: Example: Reece
With a continuous management team implementing the above, the results can be powerful. Reece has had two CEOs in 50 years - Wilson and now his son Peter - while, as mentioned, Tradelink has had at least five different senior management teams over the past 20 years. The result of this continuity for owner-managed companies is that the 'culture' that is developed over time can be an amazingly powerful weapon in a company's success. Owner-managed - The numbers re-crunchedWe have been keen on this owner-managed theme for some time and indeed in the Airlie Australian Share Fund a third of our holdings are owner-managed companies. We first put together an owner-managed index in 2018 that backed up our view that owner-managed companies overall outperformed over the long term, because of the reasons listed above. At the time, we noted the limitations of our exercise:
"Owner-managed companies have outperformed the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index over each period."We have pored over the data set and re-crunched the numbers (with the help of Macquarie Equities) to test the limitations listed above. We have included all owner-managed businesses up until the point at which the owners stepped back. Some simple conclusions have been drawn (and the numbers are shown in the table below):
Performance of owner-managed companies versus the market
Source: Macquarie Equities, Airlie Further refinementWe have further refined the notional index by applying Airlie's investment filters that favour financial strength, business quality and management capability. We believe that not all owner-managers are created equal. We feel some look after minority shareholders better than others and/or their businesses fail our quality test. As mentioned, ABC Learning and Babcock & Brown were two high-profile situations where shareholders lost all their money. Both companies failed Airlie's test on financial strength. Further, we have excluded some business models (notably the buy-now-pay-later space) where we feel there is a question mark around sustainable profits. Note that the exclusion of AfterPay penalises our notional index performance. So, taking our investment process filters and looking 10 years over the performance of owner�'managed businesses versus the broad market:
Source: Macquarie Equities, Airlie So, 10 years ago $10,000 invested in Airlie's notional owner-managed index (purple line) is worth $60,000 while $10,000 invested in the market is worth about $30,000. Of the 70 owner-managed companies that make up this notional index, the strong performers include: Fortescue, ResMed, Goodman Group, Mineral Resources, and Northern Star. To be clear, we have not owned all of these companies in our funds over the years. Although it is pretty evident to us now that our performance would have been enhanced if we had! The poorer performers include: Monadelphous, Nufarm, Freedom Foods, and Oroton. We have not held any of those companies in the fund. The small-cap effect is evident when we split our notional index into two market cap groupings. So, the bigger companies (purple) versus the smaller ones (green):
Source: Macquarie Equities, Airlie The conclusion we draw is that the owner-managed model is immensely powerful in a small company, where the success factors of owner-managers can be leveraged into truly remarkable results. Examples in our fund include ARB Corporation, Premier Investments, Nick Scali, PWR Holdings and of, course, Reece. So going back to years ago when I was allocated Reece to analyse, the market capitalisation was less than $250 million. With a market cap of nearly $9 billion today, Reece remains the poster child for the power of backing the right owner. Author: Matt Williams, Portfolio Manager Funds operated by this manager: Important Information: Units in the fund(s) referred to herein are issued by Magellan Asset Management Limited (ABN 31 120 593 946, AFS Licence No. 304 301) trading as Airlie Funds Management ('Airlie') and has been prepared for general information purposes only and must not be construed as investment advice or as an investment recommendation. This material does not take into account your investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs. This material does not constitute an offer or inducement to engage in an investment activity nor does it form part of any offer documentation, offer or invitation to purchase, sell or subscribe for interests in any type of investment product or service. You should obtain and consider the relevant Product Disclosure Statement ('PDS') and Target Market Determination ('TMD') and consider obtaining professional investment advice tailored to your specific circumstances before making a decision to acquire, or continue to hold, the relevant financial product. A copy of the relevant PDS and TMD relating to an Airlie financial product or service may be obtained by calling +61 2 9235 4760 or by visiting www.airliefundsmanagement.com.au. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results and no person guarantees the future performance of any financial product or service, the amount or timing of any return from it, that asset allocations will be met, that it will be able to implement its investment strategy or that its investment objectives will be achieved. This material may contain 'forward-looking statements'. Actual events or results or the actual performance of an Airlie financial product or service may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements. This material may include data, research and other information from third party sources. Airlie makes no guarantee that such information is accurate, complete or timely and does not provide any warranties regarding results obtained from its use. This information is subject to change at any time and no person has any responsibility to update any of the information provided in this material. Statements contained in this material that are not historical facts are based on current expectations, estimates, projections, opinions and beliefs of Airlie. Such statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, and undue reliance should not be placed thereon. Any third party trademarks contained herein are the property of their respective owners and Airlie claims no ownership in, nor any affiliation with, such trademarks. Any third party trademarks that appear in this material are used for information purposes and only to identify the company names or brands of their respective owners. No affiliation, sponsorship or endorsement should be inferred from the use of these trademarks.. This material and the information contained within it may not be reproduced, or disclosed, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Airlie. |
16 Aug 2022 - Performance Report: Insync Global Capital Aware Fund
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Fund Overview | Insync invests in a concentrated portfolio of high quality companies that possess long 'runways' of future growth benefitting from Megatrends. Megatrends are multiyear structural and disruptive changes that transform the way we live our daily lives and result from a convergence of different underlying trends including innovation, politics, demographics, social attitudes and lifestyles. They provide important tailwinds to individual stocks and sectors, that reside within them. Insync believe this delivers exponential earnings growth ahead of market expectations. The fund uses Put Options to help buffer the depth and duration that sharp, severe negative market impacts would otherwide have on the value of the fund during these events. Insync screens the universe of 40,000 listed global companies to just 150 that it views as superior. This includes profitability, balance sheet performance, shareholder focus and valuations. 20-40 companies are then chosen for the portfolio. These reflect the best outcomes from further analysis using a proprietary DCF valuation, implied growth modelling, and free cash flow yield; alongside management, competitor, and industry scrutiny. The Fund may hold some cash (maximum of 5%), derivatives, currency contracts for hedging purposes, and American and/or Global Depository Receipts. It is however, for all intents and purposes, a 'long-only' fund, remaining fully invested irrespective of market cycles. |
Manager Comments | The Insync Global Capital Aware Fund has a track record of 12 years and 10 months and has underperformed the Global Equity Index since inception in October 2009, providing investors with an annualised return of 10.11% compared with the index's return of 10.65% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 12 years and 10 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -27.39% vs the index's -15.77%, and since inception in October 2009 the fund's largest drawdown was -27.39% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -15.77%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in January 2022 and has lasted 6 months, reaching its lowest point during June 2022. The Manager has delivered these returns with 0.88% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.73 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 81% of the time in rising markets and 22% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 60% and a down-capture ratio of 82%. |
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16 Aug 2022 - Performance Report: Bennelong Twenty20 Australian Equities Fund
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Manager Comments | The Bennelong Twenty20 Australian Equities Fund has a track record of 12 years and 9 months and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in November 2009, providing investors with an annualised return of 9.77% compared with the index's return of 7.61% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 12 years and 9 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -22.27% vs the index's -11.9%, and since inception in November 2009 the fund's largest drawdown was -26.09% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in February 2020 and lasted 9 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by November 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 0.69% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.59 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 95% of the time in rising markets and 7% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 120% and a down-capture ratio of 98%. |
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16 Aug 2022 - 4D podcast: interest rates, inflation and infrastructure
4D podcast: interest rates, inflation and infrastructure 4D Infrastructure August 2022 4D's Global Portfolio Manager and Chief Investment Officer, Sarah Shaw, speaks with Bennelong's Jodie Saw about the impact changing interest rates and inflation can have on infrastructure; and the opportunities presented in the asset class.
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Funds operated by this manager: 4D Global Infrastructure Fund, 4D Emerging Markets Infrastructure FundThe content contained in this article represents the opinions of the authors. The authors may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the article. This commentary in no way constitutes a solicitation of business or investment advice. It is intended solely as an avenue for the authors to express their personal views on investing and for the entertainment of the reader. |