A few weeks ago, I hosted some teenagers from an East London school on a (virtual) visit to learn about the investment business. In search of common ground, we focused on environmental, social and governance (ESG) questions and had an interesting exchange on climate change, sweat shops and overpaid bosses.

We also discussed the difficulty of deciding how a company stacks up on its ESG credentials. To help us along, I asked them to look through a sustainability lens at the websites of Tesla, Boohoo and BP and to review the recent news flow. Their conclusions were not what I predicted.

Needless to say, all three companies have had ESG challenges along the way so it seemed a fair question to ask the students which they would score most highly from a sustainability point of view on their day as a pretend investment analyst. To cut a long story short, they all singled out BP.

I had expected Tesla's electric vehicle story to put it on top, especially as the visit pre-dated the company's recent bitcoin embarrassment. But while they were all over Boohoo's employment record, what really caught their attention was the oil major's description of its clean energy ambitions. All credit to BP's comms, but it was not what I expected.

It's good to get out of the investment bubble where ESG is an article of faith and into the real world where these issues are just one among many. That's true whether you are still at school or the boss of a quoted company, as a recent sustainability-focused survey of our actual investment analysts confirmed.

What is abundantly clear from this global snapshot of 150 researchers, and the thousands of companies they follow, is that ESG as an investment approach is new, fragmented, complicated and inconsistent.

There are huge variations in how companies view sustainability and in how investors are attempting to measure it. The absence of common standards is glaring.

Focusing in on climate, some of the findings are unsurprising. Some sectors are well on the way to a new and cleaner world. Utilities represent an obvious green investment opportunity as the proportion of renewables rises. The energy sector, on the other hand, is more notable for its risks as fossil fuels are phased out and companies are left owning worthless stranded assets. Industrials sit in the middle, with clear opportunities to benefit from the climate transition but major risks too in the form of tighter regulation, disrupted supply chains and old-world legacy businesses.

What is also evident is a yawning gap between the parts of the world where the environmental challenge is well understood and factored into long-term business plans and the places where it is not. More than 70pc of analysts in Europe think companies have the right plans in place to decarbonise by 2050. In Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa that proportion falls to a big round zero. American and Chinese companies are notable laggards on this front too, although the latter are starting to catch up fast since President Xi's adoption last year of a 2060 net zero target.

A couple of significant problems emerge from the survey. The first is that companies have been slow to link executive pay to real achievement on reducing emissions. Only a third of companies do this and only half expect their boards to demonstrate a focus on ESG more generally. Without financial incentives, sufficient progress is unlikely.

Secondly, while companies are increasingly keen to talk about ESG and sustainability, there remains a woeful lack of the internationally agreed standards that would enable investors and consumers alike to scrutinise their claims. Interestingly, in some countries like Japan, there are as many companies understating their progress in this area as over-inflating their achievements. The problem is bigger and more nuanced than greenwashing.

There's no shortage of regional standards being developed but none has yet gained any traction on a global scale. Until Europe, Asia and the US talk the same language about ESG, employ the same taxonomies and implement the same criteria to decide what is and what is not sustainable, we'll all be flailing around trying to make sense of different reporting frameworks, or worse, no reports at all.

One further problem is the clumping together of environmental, social and governance factors under one sustainability umbrella. It is too easy for companies to trumpet progress in one area while quietly glossing over their lack of interest in one or both of the others.

The solutions to the problems in each of these areas are different too. Driving change on the environmental front is most effective when governments are engaged via regulation and financial incentives. Consumers have more power when it comes to social issues. Investors have long recognised that they may be best placed to encourage progress on governance through engagement, votes or, more crudely, divestment.

Perhaps the real conclusion from all this is that, quite rapidly, ESG investing is becoming just plain investing. Companies that rate highly on the imperfect and inconsistent sustainability measures that we currently have perform well in stock market terms because they are, quite simply, better companies.

It makes sense to work towards common standards for fair comparison, but I suspect there will always be an extensive menu of these, not a single aggregate number for every company. Environmental, social and governance factors are just too varied to be corralled into one framework in the way that a company's income statement and balance sheet have been by the adoption of standardised accounting principles.

While we're working out how to measure sustainability ourselves, perhaps we could do worse than getting the kids from Tower Hamlets in to surprise us.

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© 2021 FIL Responsible Entity (Australia) Limited. Fidelity, Fidelity International and the Fidelity International logo and F symbol are trademarks of FIL Limited.

Fifty years ago, General Property Trust (GPT) listed on the ASX. In so doing, it changed the lives of income investors for good.

Since then, Australia has become a global leader in listed commercial property. Local and offshore investors have been attracted to the relatively high income of AREITs and their competitive, risk-adjusted returns.

Then came Covid and an altogether different environment tailormade to tarnish the sector.

The mighty Westfield had put Australia on the map as a global retail real estate leader but also gave us one of the highest exposures to retail real estate in the world. Within a few days of lockdown, shopping centres were empty with the enforced switch to online seeing several years of growth compressed into a few weeks.

In offices across the country a similar shift was taking place. Having prevaricated for years over the pros and cons of working-from-home, managers and their staff were surprised at how smoothly and quickly the transition occurred.

These factors were the writing on the wall for the AREIT sector. Having reached a high over 64,000 in late February 2020, the ASX300 AREIT accumulation (total return) index fell 37% in March as investors tried to comprehend the implications of the unknown. Shopping centre stocks were amongst the hardest hit, notably the large mall landlords Scentre (down 55%) and Vicinity (down 52%) as investors panicked around whether their shopping centres would ever re-open.

ASX300 (Equities) vs AREIT300 Accumulation Index

Source: APN Property Group, S&P

The forlorn outlook many experts predicted back then hasn't eventuated, with Australia's largely successful control of the pandemic getting much of the credit. Those offshore investors that ran for the hills last March have since turned tail, realising Australia was a better place to invest in a pandemic.

AREITs have since recovered significant ground with the vaccine announcement delivering a further boost. Still, the sector continues to trail the broader Australian equity market recovery (refer above chart) which is an opportunity for investors focusing on the long term.

The structural concerns that first surfaced as the pandemic took hold, along with the absence of international tourists and immigration, explain much of the gap. The Government-mandated Leasing Code of Conduct was also a significant burden (not placed on most businesses) for landlords.

The code removed a tenant's obligation to meet contracted rental payments under the lease contract, meaning landlords were having to support their business partner (tenants) which created great uncertainty for investors. As some support is still being provided, this continues to weigh on the sector's recovery.

Thus far, AREIT landlords have provided more than $1b in support under the Code, with almost all of it ( more than 90%) delivered by owners of retail properties (notably large malls).

The unintended consequence is that those businesses most impacted by the pandemic - namely large mall landlords, Scentre and Vicinity - have provided the highest levels of tenant support. The impact on their bottom lines has been pronounced and prolonged.

Where are the opportunities?

While all AREITs have recovered significantly from their March 2020 lows it is in the dispersion of that performance where opportunities lie. Those AREITs currently trading well below their pre-pandemic 2020 highs include Vicinity (down 40%), Scentre Group (down 34%) and GPT (down 27%) all of whom were burdened with additional Covid impacts (Lockdowns and the leasing Code).  These names will recover, providing solid returns to investors focused on the long term.

However, as always, there's a caveat. AREIT performance is inextricably linked to the Australian economy. On that score, the ongoing recovery will be boosted by six factors:

1. a return to the office will assist struggling CBD retail as foot traffic rises;
2. price growth in residential property and ongoing construction will boost retail, especially DIY and homeware categories and improving consumer confidence. Consumers' willingness to spend, a key plank in the path for a return to pre-Covid life, should gather pace;
3. the vaccine roll-out will further lift business and consumer confidence;
4. the return of international tourism, potentially exceeding prior levels (revenge travel as consumers look to catch-up), should have a similar impact;
5. as will the return of international students, with residential and retail property clearly benefiting. Overseas students can also help us address current labour shortages; and
6. the return of immigration will be a major economic driver and, as with foreign students, residential real estate will be a major beneficiary, with flow on benefits for office/retail and other real estate sectors.

These factors point to AREITs performing well over coming years. Between 2010 and 2019 AREITs returned 11.6% p.a. (mainly from income). According to UBS data, over the past 20 years AREITs have delivered an average return of 9.6% a year, including an average distribution yield of 6.9% p.a. The income investors received is almost 50% higher than equities over this period.

This is a key takeaway for income investors - it is the income component of AREIT returns that is the most predictable. With the recovery underway, investors can again expect to rely on it.

The risks

The major risks to the AREIT sector concern all those factors that may apprehend the economic recovery. Inflationary pressures that may result in higher interest rates, damaging the wealth effect, the continued slow pace of vaccine rollout and more damaging mutations should all be considered. While inflation has become a growing concern across financial markets, it could see more investors turn to commercial real estate which has leases that have inflation linked or fixed rental escalations providing a level of protection that other asset classes cannot provide.

And there remain unknowns in the office and retail sectors, although in our view these are diminishing each day. In sticking to high quality, well-located properties with premium tenants, as APN Property Group likes to do, these risks can generally be offset.

Three major trends

1.  The benefits of funds management earnings to AREIT growth

In recent years, Charter Hall and Goodman Group have grown their funds management operations. Their moves proved prescient. Covid highlighted the reliability of their earnings under significant market stress. As recognised leaders in real estate asset management, the growth in funds management earnings by AREITs is set to continue.

2.  Not all retail is created equal

Large malls with heavy exposure to discretionary retail suffered from lockdowns and reduced foot traffic while non-discretionary convenience centres underpinned by supermarkets thrived. Large format retail (LFR) centres, meanwhile, fed our demand for homewares, electrical, furniture and everyday needs. A recent LFR transaction occurred at a 50% premium to the December 2020 valuation. Post-Covid, most assets will continue to deliver healthy income but investors should remember not all retail is created equal.

3.  Say hello to new commercial property asset classes

Already, there are two listed Childcare (or social infrastructure) REITs with more to come. Hotels (pubs) and primary produce is another sector getting attention from commercial property investors with FY21 seeing a record year of transactions. Service stations assets also deliver bond-like returns but with growing income, underpinned by high quality tenant covenants and strong investor demand (2020 saw a record level of transactions) with the added benefit of alternative use potential (when electric vehicles dominate our roads). The future AREIT index may look more like its US counterpart, where commercial property investors can add healthcare properties, life science and government buildings and even mobile phone towers to their portfolios.

This article has been prepared by APN Funds Management Limited (ACN 080 674 479, AFSL No. 237500) for general information purposes only and without taking your objectives, financial situation or needs into account. You should consider these matters and read the product disclosure statement (PDS) for each of the funds described in this article in its entirety before you make an investment decision. The PDS contains important information about risks, costs and fees associated with an investment in the relevant fund. For a copy of the PDS and more details about a fund and its performance, visit our website at www.apngroup.com.au.

At midnight a couple of days ago the FDA announced the approval Biogen's Alzheimer's drug aducanumab.

Usually when a drug is approved it's cause for celebration, the culmination of perhaps decades of academic and clinical work. The moment is hugely meaningful for patients, doctors, and their families. 

Not in this case. The FDA's independent scientific panel and own statisticians concluded this drug had no measurable effect. 

Aducanumab was tested in two well designed Phase III trials. They were double-blind, placebo-controlled, dose-ranging, and most important of all, with thousands of patients around the world, they were large enough to power a result. If this drug had any significant effect, it had plenty of opportunity to show it.

Instead, the trials were halted early for futility and the drug caused dangerous brain swelling in some 40% of recipients. Which makes the decision all the more surprising. 

When China and Russia announced they had coronavirus vaccines, the world ignored them and looked to the FDA. This is the institution that stood alone against thalidomide. And this week it approved a drug with no evidence of efficacy. 

Biogen tortured the data, mixing patients from one study where the drug had a marginal benefit, with the other, that showed a marginal decline. This sort of post-hoc data mixing to prove a point is a statistical crime.

The FDA didn't approve on this sketchy basis, but rather because the drug cleared amyloid beta plaques. And it was on this, rather than Biogen's shonky data manipulation, that the drug was approved.

Long-time readers will know that we share the increasingly common view that amyloid beta hypothesis is flawed as:
1) every drug that clears amyloid beta fails to show any clinical benefit (there have been many), and
2) many people die naturally with plenty of amyloid beta in their brains, but never get Alzheimer's. 

A hypothesis that actually fits the medical data is that amyloid beta is an effect, not a cause.

The situation is worsened by Biogen's commercial cynicism.

Analysts coalesced around a $10k annual cost estimate for the drug, with the highest at $25k. Biogen has stated they will charge US$56k pa, for a chronic disease that lasts years. 

The FDA asked Biogen to conduct a confirmatory study to prove the drug's effectiveness.

Biogen promptly announced they complete this trial in 2030, giving almost a decade to sell a dangerous, useless drug... and that's before the inevitable delays. We can be sure this study will be done as slowly as possible.

The FDA made a similar call with Sarepta, approving a drug against their own expert advice, on condition of a confirmatory trial. Five years later, the trial has not been done. Why would any company pay money to kill their golden goose?

In another Biogen-friendly curiosity, the FDA approved the drug for all Alzheimer's patients, not just those with early stage disease or with particular biomarkers. There are over 5 million Alzheimer's patients in the US, so the cost of this could exceed US$100 billion a year. That is enough to move the needle on the entire US medical system. This decision could blow back hard onto the pharmaceutical industry.

As one of our advisors put it, it will be quite some time before the full ramifications become clear. 

Recently there has been a flurry of research into alternative theoriers that fit the data, offer new clinical targets, and in early stage trials have demonstrated a clinical effect. We have small investments in two of these. The FDA's decision will starve these alternative approaches of oxygen. The rational move for every company with a failed beta-amyloid drug is now to resurrect it.

Patient advocacy groups, weaponized by Biogen, have something to answer for here.

The correct approach would have been to allow Biogen to conduct a further study, if they so wished, to prove the drug worked. 

It's early days, but this looks like the biggest scandal in pharma since Valeant and Bill Ackman's corporate skullduggery led to the methodical axing of R&D departments several years ago. Three members of the FDA's advisory panel have already resigned in protest. 

In Biogen, a new corporate villain has been born.

Disclaimer

The information in this note has been prepared and issued by Frazis Capital Partners Pty Ltd ABN 16 625 521 986 as a corporate authorised representative (CAR No. 1263393) of Frazis Capital Management Pty Ltd ABN 91 638 965 910 AFSL 521445. The Frazis Fund is open to wholesale investors only, as defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Company is not authorised to provide financial product advice to retail clients and information provided does not constitute financial product advice to retail clients.

The information provided is for general information purposes only, and does not take into account the personal circumstances or needs of investors. The Company and its directors or employees or associates will use their endeavours to ensure that the information is accurate as at the time of its publication.  Notwithstanding this, the Company excludes any representation or warranty as to the accuracy, reliability, or completeness of the information contained on the company website and published documents.​

The past results of the Company's investment strategy do not necessarily guarantee the future performance or profitability of any investment strategies devised or suggested by the Company.​

The Company, and its directors or employees or associates, do not guarantee the performance of any financial product or investment decision made in reliance of any material in this document. The Company does not accept any loss or liability which may be suffered by a reader of this document.

We have seen a range of increasingly interventionist monetary policies unleashed over the last 20 years, and we're now solidly onto the next version. This one will be loose money and loose fiscal. Should be fun, as long as you are prepared for inflation. 

Inflation is now here. It really never went away. Hedonic methods of calculating what was already an imprecise gauge of price changes, have obfuscated, and of course lowered, the official figures. If you wish to see what pre-hedonic calculations would have gauged inflation levels to be today, check out the two charts below on inflation as per the 1990 methodology and the 1980 methodology. Both are by courtesy of shadowstats whose authors provide a plethora of 'real' economic data. www.shadowstats.com

We now actually have an admission of sorts that inflation is here and, woops, higher than promised. Don't wait for any apology. There won't be one.

https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/yellen-admits-inflation-about-soar-says-it-will-be-plus-society

To be fair it's not entirely the current Administration's fault. The asymmetrical approach to interest rates, inflation and sound money in general, started with 'Maestro' and has snowballed since.

Nonetheless a perverse sort of Gresham's Law is applying here - bad policies continue to drive out good. Inflation is the new good thing, and we should welcome it. Yet as Ronald Reagan said in 1978, "Inflation is as violent as a mugger, as frightening as an armed robber and as deadly as a hit man."

Memories indeed are short. We are potentially near the end of the liberal era of economic policy with which Regan and Thatcher were associated. Prepare for more government, more rules, and different risks.

Since none of us is going to be in charge of macro-economic policy (at least anytime soon) and we have to invest to maintain our spending power in real terms, against this backdrop of understated inflation and carefully massaged negative real interest rates, how should we proceed?

The answer is to invest in certain equities which are better inflation hedged and which simultaneously provide a better hedge against risk of catastrophic corporate failure.

Do not ignore equities even if you are at an 'advanced age'. Conventional wisdom states that the allocation to fixed interest should rise as you get older. A rule of thumb is that you should have your age as a % in fixed income. So, at 60, you should have 60% in bonds. At current levels of interest rates and inflation, this will almost certainly guarantee an erosion in real purchasing power. Don't do it!

Inflation and corporate failure hedges

Two dimensions should be used to assess which are the better equities to currently overweight if you wish to buy inflation protection. One is Governance as in the 'G' in "ESG" (We think ESG is still improperly used); the other is sector membership and the stability of revenue growth and asset base. Both have an impact on returns, downside protection and survivability.

Below we show how and why better Governed companies have a better survival rate and thus should have a lower discount rate applied to their dividends. These companies are still currently undervalued.

We then show that in the last 40 years, the risk of catastrophic loss in certain USA sectors has been much greater in some than others. Any investor with a time horizon beyond 5 minutes should thus weight their equity exposure to companies in these sectors.

We have written before on ESG and why we think G is relevant as a risk factor but not necessarily as an alpha factor. We show again below the wide range of ESG cores from different ESG ratings agencies, courtesy of Northfield. No alignment here which implies there is no single ESG standard that can be applied.

This article provides a recent assessment of ESG scores and how they are barely useful. https://www.ipe.com/viewpoint-why-companies-and-investors-must-leave-esg-ratings-behind/10053120.article

Nonetheless, good G as measured by its impact on corporate financials, IS useful. Sensible leverage, correct levels of re-investment, and staff retention are all part of any Fundamental or Qualitative assessment in deriving the correct discount rate to apply to a companies' future earnings. Good G can justify lower discount rates through higher survival rates, and thus lower risk.

Below is some analysis of the performance of high G companies in a crisis. Think of it as built-in downside protection to favour high G companies.

Sector membership matters too with respect to survival rates. Most companies do not last. Many companies fail and will continue to fail. Go back and watch any sporting event from 40 years ago. How many of the companies on the advertising billboards are still around today?

What really hurts compounding of returns is a catastrophic loss of capital; it only takes a few stocks to seriously fall for the poorly designed portfolio to suffer serious damage. So how to avoid this risk, and not expose your wealth to risk of failure? Check out the table below drawn from Factset and Refinitiv data.

So, a 70% decline in price aka catastrophic loss, hurts 40% of all listed USA stocks. However, some sectors have historically seen more casualties than others.

If you wish to be safer, especially at this juncture, then look within Utilities, Consumer Staples, Financials Materials and Industrials. By market cap these comprise much less than half of the stock market so active management will prove its worth here.

Companies meeting these two criteria of good G and sector membership, are priced and behave as "index linked corporate bonds". In this regard they are unique. They provide a decent yield compared to the pitifully low or even negative rate on 'safe' government bonds and the current yield on index linked bonds, which of course is negative; AND they offer a measure of hedge against inflation since equities are a claim on nominal growth which conventional bonds are not. Index Linked bonds do provide a hedge against inflation but with negative yields, they are expensive. Buying an index linked bond with a negative yield of 1.5% and not a utility company with a dividend yield of 4% is giving up annually, a 5.5% return.

Equities we own which meet these criteria are in the Global Listed Infrastructure Strategy and the Global Equity Strategy. They include AES, Quanta Services, Johnson Controls, OneOK, Enbridge, Terna, ENEL, Rubis, General Mills, Kroger, Iron Mountain, ENN, Hydro One and Verizon.

We view this as getting a yield in line with corporate bonds, AND the index linking of an inflation proof bond. These companies will have a greater chance of survival in the long run if history is a guide.

The chances of a macro policy misstep are now high, so this is the time to be thinking about survivor strategies.

Here is a slide of returns over the last 18 years accruing to equities, government bonds, infrastructure equities and blends of each. Even during this period of 'growth' equity excitement, one didn't lose out too much by having exposure to defensive stocks in sectors with high chances of surviving a shock.

Currently therefore we are overweight Utilities, Infrastructure and Industrials. Given their superior survival characteristics, their lower P/E multiples and higher dividend yields they look attractive. Add in the likely buying frenzy to be unleashed as other investors scramble to get behind the newly discovered infrastructure spending plans in the USA and Europe, the best place to have risk would appear to be in these companies rather than the now very vulnerable to regulation, non-tax paying, non-voting share class issuing, expensive stocks of yesteryear.

The great thing about the stock market is that complacency, one trick ponies, and luck, get found out over time. Betting on price momentum with an absence of thoughtful, rigorous, analysis on valuations, risks, and portfolio construction tools and without any knowledge of long-term history, is a disaster waiting to happen.

We examine the relationship between ESG scores and investment performance and observe that there is a significantly stronger relationship between investment performance and a company's potential for ESG improvement, as compared to the company's ESG score. Deep research and extensive engagement can help value investors capitalize on ESG controversy and access this potential source of alpha.

Introduction

One of the most intense areas of interest in the investment world today is how practitioners are integrating the consideration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues into their investment processes. Some managers have taken a quantitative approach, incorporating an evolving set of tools to invest in companies with high ESG scores. While others, Pzena included, have focused on the integration of ESG issues into the investment process and working with companies, as active owners, to address those issues. An integrated approach appreciates the contribution ESG data providers have made to improving the availability and quality of data in the marketplace but does not use overall ESG scores to make investment decisions. From our perspective, an ESG score is simply one of many inputs to our investment process and by no means the arbiter of investment decisions. That is something that will always be the purview of our bottom-up, fundamentally-driven research team. Nevertheless, we are committed to furthering our understanding of the utility of ESG scores, particularly as it relates to positions or issues that clients have challenged us on. We, therefore, embarked on an intellectual exercise, making use of MSCI's ESG ratings to examine three questions.

• Are stocks with lower ESG scores cheaper?
• Is there a relationship between ESG scores and investment performance?
• Is there a relationship between ESG score improvement and investment performance?

Based on our analysis, initial indications suggest there is not a significant relationship between a company's ESG score and future investment performance, however, we observed a stronger relationship between ESG score improvement and future investment performance. Given the inherent limitations of data for these analyses, as discussed in Appendix A (at the end of this article), these observations, while interesting, should be considered an incremental contribution to furthering the knowledge base in this area, and directional at best.

Lower ESG-Rated Stocks May Be Marginally Cheaper

We started by testing the hypothesis that lower ESG rated stocks are cheaper than the overall universe. We used MSCI industry-adjusted ESG scores (IAS) to divide each universe into five quintiles with proportional sectoral representation. As such, each of the quintiles had the same number of companies from each sector to avoid any sectoral bias in ESG scores. As seen in Figures 1 and 2, the lowest ESG score quintile tends to be slightly cheaper than the overall universe. While the gap is not very large, it is noteworthy that this quintile had a lower price-to-book (P/B) valuation than the universe average in 21 of 27 quarters in the Global universe, and 25 of 27 quarters in the US universe. As such, it is probably reasonable to say that, in general, lower ESG-rated stocks appear to be slightly cheaper than the overall universe.

Relationship Between ESG Scores and Investment Performance

For this analysis, we focused on the relationship between IAS ESG scores and investment performance, as described in Appendix B, Methodology (at the end of this article). We divided the universe into five quintiles, each with the same proportionate sectoral representation based on IAS ESG scores, and we compared the three-year rolling total shareholder returns of each of the quintiles (equally weighted). A strong relationship should, ideally, exhibit three key characteristics. First, there should be a meaningful difference of measured return across quintiles; second, it should follow a monotonic trend across the quintiles (i.e., the highest ESG score improvement quintile outperforms the next improvement quintile, which outperforms the next, and so on), and last, the observed relationship should hold across both the Global and the US data sets. While both results (Figure 3) show that the lowest ESG scores tend to have weaker performance, the monotonic trend of declining performance with lower ESG scores is only visible in US universe.

There is no such relationship in the Global universe where the best return is from the fourth-worst ESG score quintile. Additionally, the return differential for the Global universe quintiles is much less accentuated than the US universe. On the basis of this analysis, the evidence does not demonstrate a strong and sustainable relationship between ESG scores and investment returns. Also remember that this period coincides with a strong push by asset managers to own higher ESG rated names, thus bidding them up, while excluding weaker-rated ESG names, leading to lower valuations, thereby creating a performance differential. While it is hard to parse that effect, strong investor preference for higher ESG-rated shares clearly implies that the relationship visible only in the US universe is also likely less strong than it appears, if it exists.

Relationship Between ESG Score Improvement and Investment Performance

We further focused on understanding the relationship of ESG score improvement to investment performance. For this analysis, we divided the universe into five quintiles, each with the same proportionate sectoral representation based on improvement in IAS ESG scores, and compared the three-year rolling total shareholder returns of each of the quintiles (equally weighted). As seen in Figure 4, there appears to be a significantly stronger relationship between ESG score improvement and total shareholder returns. On average, stocks with improved ESG scores tend to outperform stocks with lower improvement in their ESG scores. This relationship is equally strong across both universes and is monotonic.

Investment Implications

Given the study's limitations, it is unwise to draw strong conclusions, but it may be plausible to make certain inferences. This analysis elucidates that ESG score improvement has potentially a much stronger relationship to investment performance than a pure ESG score. That also makes sense as most ESG ratings are backward-looking and miss the direction of change. That means that weak ESG scores themselves are not negative. In fact, a weak ESG score could be a reason why the stock is cheap; and it may be a great investment opportunity if the company has solid ESG improvement potential, irrespective of its current rating. Investing in those stocks is a win-win because the community is better served when a company improves its ESG prudence, and investors benefit by way of strong shareholder returns. Clearly not every company will improve its ESG performance. Deep company-specific investment research is critical to identify the stocks that can be followed by extensive and continuous engagement with the company to help management in their transition to better ESG performance. Shareholder engagement helps investors determine which transition plans are sound (and which aren't). More importantly, it gives investors a voice to ensure that companies allocate capital efficiently to projects that make sense. For example, with the transition to a lower-carbon economy underway, starving economically critical businesses of capital because they are more carbon-intensive will only make the monumental task of the transition that much harder. Walking away, i.e., divesting from these companies, achieves nothing and may drive them to other less-accountable sources of capital than the public markets. Through engagement, market participants can select which energy players are putting capital to work more effectively and allocate investments accordingly.

ESG and Value Investing

A widely-held belief is that value stocks are weak on ESG and weak ESG stocks tend to underperform, implying that value investing and ESG prudence are in conflict, even mutually exclusive. This study opens up this view for debate, suggesting that value investors can capitalize on valuation dislocations due to ESG considerations by understanding the long-term impact of company-specific ESG improvement actions. A combination of deep research and extensive engagement are necessary for investors to access this potential source of alpha generation. In that respect, the company's ESG score likely matters less than the selection and monitoring of investments based on improvement potential. Our focus, therefore, is not on the absolute score, or even good versus bad ESG scores, but on whether we believe the company can recover its normalized earnings power over time. The combination of deep research and extensive engagement can help value investors like us capitalize on ESG controversy to achieve the objective of generating superior investment returns. We highlight this approach of engagement-led ESG improvement through the following two case studies.

CASE STUDY ONE

Enel S.p.A. - A Utility in Transition

The story of Enel, a diversified utility based in Rome, Italy, is one of a company forced to recover from self-inflicted wounds while navigating an evolving sector disrupted by the widespread adoption of green energy. These two headwinds created a classic value opportunity where the quality of the company's core business was obscured by poor results and fears of disruption. New management cut costs, implemented a culture of capital discipline, simplified the business, and invested prudently to better position the company for the changing landscape, creating the potential for a robust earnings recovery and a re-rating of the stock. Our conviction in Enel's turnaround was largely predicated on improvements in management's approach to environmental risks and corporate governance practices.

In terms of the environment, Enel had been shifting its focus toward businesses that stood to benefit in the new utility landscape: electricity distribution, renewables generation, and broader digitalization, such as smart meters. This came with a commitment to allocate 95% of its capital expenditure over multiple years to focus on these initiatives. Today, Enel is the largest non-government-owned renewable operator in the world, with over 49 GW of installed renewable energy capacity. Enel is continuing to expand its renewable offering, targeting 60 GW by 2022; at which point it will generate almost 60% of its total production from renewables. In tandem, Enel is phasing out coal generation by 2025-2027 (recently accelerated from 2030) and will completely decarbonize by 2050. Enel should also benefit from increased network investments, a necessary part of this energy transition that should enable Enel to earn solid regulated returns due to governments' desire for an upgraded, more efficient grid.

Governance improvements started with the appointment of a new CEO in 2014. He was leading Enel's growing green power division and was well suited to help the company navigate the disruption posed by renewables. He proceeded to transform Enel in numerous ways: increasing operating efficiency; streamlining the corporate structure; focusing capital spending on stable businesses; shifting away from traditional generation and commodity exposure; and improving capital allocation. He discarded major transformative acquisitions, instead focusing on select bolt-on deals, reduced debt, and invested in the business to address energy transition risk. Enel also increased its focus on returning capital to shareholders. It has increased its dividend at a double-digit rate since 2013 and committed to a 70% payout ratio going forward. Through these changes, Enel has transformed from an industry laggard for environmental and governance risks to an efficiently run industry leader with a stable business mix well-positioned for future growth. The company's turnaround (from 2016 to 2019) broadly mirrors the performance period we examined. Over this time Enel's stock experienced a 77% 3-year return, and the company was upgraded by MSCI from an A to AA ESG rating.

CASE STUDY TWO

Wilmar International Ltd. - Affecting Change in a Controversial Industry

Wilmar is a leading Asian agribusiness with operations in palm oil refining, oilseed crushing, and manufacturing of consumer products. The palm oil industry is notoriously controversial, garnering negative media attention for its role in rainforest deforestation and inadequate protection of labour rights in the supply chain. Driven largely by consumer pressure, large buyers of palm oil - specifically consumer goods companies such as Unilever and Nestle - have increasingly pushed their suppliers to shore up a sustainable palm oil supply chain. Wilmar is a classic example of where business success became inherently tied to improvement in ESG practices.

We identified several ESG issues around deforestation for palm plantations, child labour and human rights in the palm supply chain, supplier management, and sustainable palm oil production. We engaged with the senior management and the chief sustainability officer extensively to assess their commitment to addressing these sustainability and labour practice issues. As shareholders in Wilmar, we focused our engagement to fully evaluate the investment risks, as well as to ensure that the company understood the gravity of these issues and to emphasize management actions and investments to proactively address these issues.

Wilmar instituted a zero-tolerance 'no deforestation, no peat, no exploitation policy in 2013, but most notable is the work Wilmar undertook to significantly enhance its supply chain compliance and monitoring efforts. This culminated in the signing of a joint statement with consumer goods companies in December 2018 that established a clear zero-tolerance policy for all Wilmar suppliers - with any transgression resulting in immediate suspension of the supplier until a remediation plan is in effect. Wilmar was the first major player in the market to make this commitment to zero-tolerance, which undoubtedly positioned it favourably among its major customers.

In 2016, Amnesty International published an explosive report alleging widespread exploitative labour practices (including child labour) at the farms Wilmar purchases its raw material from, as well as at their own Wilmar-owned plantations. Amnesty International made a calculated move to highlight Wilmar because Wilmar's scale allows it to effect change throughout the value chain while trying to influence individual small farmers is less efficient. While child labour was not knowingly occurring at any Wilmar plantation, and many of the allegations were unfounded, negative reputational repercussions lingered for some time in the market. The claims in the 2016 report notwithstanding, Wilmar has made substantial improvements in its identification and management of labour rights issues. These efforts include education initiatives implemented at the planation level and publication of a human rights and women's charter framework.

In our engagements, we found the company and its founders to be focused on franchise longevity and very willing to proactively address these business risks. Wilmar has made steady progress which has accelerated over the last five years, achieving significant progress in both ESG ratings and profitability. The timeframe of these improvements broadly mirrors the performance period we examined (2015 to 2018) where Wilmar experienced a 41% total shareholder return and was simultaneously upgraded by MSCI from a BB to BBB ESG rating. Wilmar's sustainability efforts have improved enough such that company was listed for the first time on the well-respected Dow Jones Sustainability Index in 2020 and scored above the 90th percentile for indicators related to raw material sourcing, human rights, and labour practices.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Study Limitations

There are several limitations of this analysis. Most importantly, the time period is too short to measure long term trends with meaningful significance. Additionally, this period is during one of the worst divergences in growth and value returns, potentially creating distortions in performance analysis. The analysis relies on MSCI's ESG ratings; while having continuously improved the rigor and coverage of its ratings, MSCI was still in the evolutionary phase in terms of depth and sophistication of the scoring mechanism. It is, however, the most comprehensive data set we have available for the duration of the study. Also, we used rolling three-year performance periods and, given the duration of our analysis, it weighs interim periods higher in the eventual calculations. Lastly, as with all correlations, a relationship between ESG factors and performance as demonstrated in the analysis does not imply causation in any way.

Appendix B: Methodology

The analysis is based on MSCI company ESG scores from January 1, 2014 - July 1, 2020, taken at the beginning of every quarter. We used MSCI's Industry Adjusted Scores (IAS) instead of absolute scores. IAS normalize the scores across industries thereby helping us avoid data bias as some industries have inherently lower scores versus others. To further eliminate any sectoral skews, all the analysis was performed on sector-neutral quintiles - i.e., we divided companies in each GICS sector into 5 equal quintiles to ensure proportionate sectoral representation in each quintile. That ensured that within each quintile, it has the same mix of number of names from each sector same as that of the universe. We performed our analysis on two universes - Global and US. Our Global universe included the top 2000 names globally by market cap and our US universe included the top 1000 names listed in US by market cap. We eliminated about 20% of the names in each of the universes due to lack of data. For each of the names in the universe, we collected MSCI's Industry Adjusted Scores (IAS) at the beginning of each quarter from January 1, 2014 to July 1, 2020. We used CapitalIQ to calculate total shareholder returns for each of the corresponding periods for our stock performance analysis. For each analysis, we used a simple average of total shareholder returns of all the companies in the respective quintiles for all the 3-year periods for the time frame of our study, January 1, 2014 - July 1, 2020. This implied 15 3-year time periods starting from January 1, 2014 to January 1, 2017 and last one being from July 1, 2017 to July 1, 2020. As we used a simple average, it effectively meant all the performance calculations are based on equal-weighting of the stocks in each quintile.

This document is intended solely for informational purposes. The views expressed reflect the current views of Pzena Investment Management ("PIM") as of the date hereof and are subject to change. PIM does not undertake to advise you of any changes in the views expressed herein. There is no guarantee that any projection, forecast, or opinion in this material will be realized. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk, including risk of total loss. This document does not constitute a current or past recommendation, an offer, or solicitation of an offer to purchase any securities or provide investment advisory services and should not be construed as such. The information contained herein is general in nature and does not constitute legal, tax, or investment advice. PIM does not make any warranty, express or implied, as to the information's accuracy or completeness. 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Alignment with ESG principles is becoming imperative in investment management. A majority (86%) of Australians expect their super or other investments to be invested responsibly and ethically. In addition to the expectation of returns not being compromised, investors also expect these investments to have a real environmental, societal or governance impact, not just "ethics washing".